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CHAPTER 21 
Insurance Law 
JOSEPH F. RYAN and WALTER J. CONNELLY 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§21.1. Liability insurance: Additional or omnibus insured. In 
Hemingway Brothers Interstate Trucking Co. v. Great American In-
demnity Co.,1 the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to characterize 
itself as falling within the definition of "an additional or omnibus 
insured" under a motor vehicle liability policy that had been issued 
by the defendant. The plaintiff was a common carrier with interstate 
rights and had entered into an agreement with one Norris, under 
which Norris had agreed to lease his tractor to the plaintiff and haul 
plaintiff's trailer from New York City to Portland, Maine. The lease, 
obviously drawn to place full responsibility for the operation of the 
trailer on Norris, obligated him to provide the driver, and provided 
that nothing therein was to be so construed as to make Norris or the 
driver the agent of the plaintiff. The only controls retained by the 
plaintiff over the vehicle were the rights to designate the freight to be 
handled and to specify the routes to be traveled and the destination of 
the freight. The defendant was the insurer of the Norris tractor under 
a motor vehicle liability policy which contained a clause that in-
corporated the language of G.L., c. 90, §34A, defining the term insured 
as follows: 
The unqualified word "insured" includes the named insured and 
also includes any other person responsible for the operation of 
the motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the 
named insured.2 
The vehicle was involved in an accident, suit was brought by the 
!-: .. -~rl ~~~•;no nnd j"dcrmPnt W~ I~COVered a.Jrainst the nlaintiff. 
§19.2 LABOR. RELATIONS LAW 499 
and various legislative developments in the Commonwealth arising 
during the 1970 SURVEY year.6 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
. §1_9.2. Enjoining strikes in breach of contract. By far the most 
significant and most discussed development in labor law in the 1970 
SuRvEY year was the case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 
770,1 in whi;h it was ~eld that despite the anti-injunction provisions 
of the Norns-LaGuardia Act.2 a federal district court m · · 
1
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judgment and brought this action in contract, arguing that the term 
insured as defined in the policy extended to it, and that the defendant 
should therefore have defended th_e. suit and paid the judgment. The 
Court rejected this argument, ·noting that the agreement between 
Norris and the plaintiff did not place the responsibility of the tractor's 
operation on the plaintiff; it was, in fact, drafted to avoid this pos-
sibility. The plaintiff never had possession nor attempted to exercise 
control of the tractor-trailer combination. It could not have been 
responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle with the express 
or implied consent of the insured, Norris. 
The plaintiff here was exposed to a liability against which it was 
obviously trying to protect itself in the drawing of the lease. In such 
a situation, it would be advisable to address the problem of liability 
insurance expressly by requiring the owner of the vehicle to add the 
lessee as a named insured in the policy. 
§21.2. Liability insurance: Obligation to defend insured. The 
rather delicate problem of the legality of an insurer's defending its 
insured by insisting upon control of the case, while reserving its rights 
to disclaim the obligation to pay any judgment recovered against that 
insured, was presented by Three Sons) Inc. v. Phoenix Insurance Cool 
The plaintiff operated a restaurant in which it was licensed (under 
G.L., c. 138, §12) to sell alcoholic beverages. Plaintiff's operations 
were insured by the defendant under a general liability policy which 
contained a clause excluding 
liability imposed upon the insured ... as a person ... engaged in 
the business of manufacturing, selling or distributing: alcoholic 
beverages, or as an owner or lessor of premises used for such 
purposes, by reason of any statute or ordinance pertaining to the 
sale, gift, distribution or use of any alcoholic beverage .... 2 
Suit was brought against the present plaintiff for injuries suffered 
by a claimant struck by a· motor vehicle operated by a customer of 
the plaintiff who allegedly had become intoxicated by beverages sold 
by the plaintiff in violation of G.L., c. 138, §69.3 
When called upon to defend the action, the insurer indicated that 
it would be willing to do so only if it could have control of the de-
fense, while reserving its right to disclaim its obligation to indemnify 
the insured. The insured rejected this arrangement and brought this 
bill. for declaratory relief. 
The Supreme Judicial Court first held that the exclusion in the 
policy was limited to instances in which provisions for civil liability 
§21.2. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 257 N.E.2d 774. 
2 Id. at 525-526, 257 N.E.2d at 775. Emphasis was added by the Court. 
3 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968), noted in 
1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.14. G.L., c. 138, § 69, is a criminal statute proscribing 
the sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons. 
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were incorporated in the pertinent statute itself as remedies for its 
violation; here, violation of the statute constituted only evidence of 
negligence. The Court stated: 
... It is clear that the basis of [the underlying] tort action is 
grounded in the common law doctrine of negligence and not on 
the violation of a statute. The judge rightly ruled that the . . . 
action was not within the exclusion clause of the policy.4 
Finding, therefore, a duty to defend on the part of the insurer, the 
Court further stated that the insurer was without right to insist upon 
control of the case when it might later disclaim liability under the 
policy. In so deciding, the Court expressly recognized the serious 
dilemma facing an insured in this situation and commented that "[i]f 
liability is established, or a settlement reached, and the insurer has a 
valid ground for disclaimer, the insured is left with a liability which, 
had he been able to defend or settle on other terms, might never have 
existed."5 It should be noted that the interests of the insurer and 
insured are not always parallel in situations such as this. Depending 
upon how the facts are presented, the third party's claim may or may 
not fall within the coverage of the policy. The Court was quite prop-
erly unwilling to sanction the practice of allowing an unsupervised 
counsel to represent both the insurer and the insured, for he might 
succumb to the temptation of performing his task of advocacy in such 
a way that the case develops in favor of the insurance company paying 
his fee. 
§21.3. Liability insurance: Notice of occurrence. A provision in 
a homeowner's policy requiring that the company be given written 
notice "as soon as practicable" after an occurrence was not satisfied by 
a notice 85 days after the occurrence, where the only apparent excuse 
was that the insured was not aware that the event was covered until 
an attorney had an opportunity to examine the policy in detail. This 
holding of the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts in Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dolby1 conforms 
with the rule in Massachusetts and most other jurisdictions.2 
§21.4. Reinsurance: Definition of loss. What constitutes a loss 
under a reinsurance policy was considered in Boston Insurance Co. 
v. Fawcett.! The Boston Insurance Co. (Boston) insured Yale Express 
System, Inc. (Yale) under a basic cargo policy which provided coverage 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 528, 257 N.E.2d 774, 776. 
o Id. at 529, 257 N.E.2d at 777. 
§21.3. 1 305 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 See, e.g., Comeau v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 350 Mass. 769, 215 N.E.2d 175 
(1966); Brackman v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 349 Mass. 767, 208 N.E.2d 225 
(1965); Segal v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 337 Mass. 185, 148 N.E.2d 659 (1958). 
§21.4. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 258 N.E.2d 771. 
3
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for each and every loss in excess of $75,000 under an ICC endorsement. 
Boston also agreed to pay each and every claim of Yale's shippers and 
consignees not in excess of $1000. However, under the policy, Boston 
would be entitled to reimbursements from Yale for the payment of 
the ICC endorsement claims. Boston, in turn, purchased a reinsurance 
policy from the defendants which provided that the defendants would 
indemnify Boston for "the sums which [Boston] shall become liable 
to pay and shall pay under [the Basic Cargo Policy]." This coverage 
was limited to "the excess of loss over U.S. $75,000 ... each and every 
loss ... ,"2 
On May 24, 1965, Yale filed a petition for reorganization under 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.a Prior to that date, Boston had not 
paid any ICC endorsement claims. After that date, Boston did make 
payments to various shippers and consignees in amounts less than 
$1000, the aggregate of which exceeded $75,000. Boston then brought 
this suit for declaratory judgment seeking, in substance, a judicial 
ruling that the defendants reinsured Boston against the risk that Yale 
would be financially unable to discharge the small claims against it, 
that the aggregate liability would therefore fall upon Boston, and that 
this event constituted a "cargo loss" within the meaning of the re-
insurance policy. 
The Supreme Judicial Court refused to accept this reasoning, stating 
as follows: 
... The impairment of Yale's ability to reimburse Boston "for 
any and all sums ... which ... [Boston] shall have paid in con-
nection with [thousands of ICC Form claims]" is not, we think, 
a "cargo loss" within the meaning of the term "each and every 
loss" in the reinsurance policies.4 
The Court therefore directed the entry of a decree declaring the 
defendants not liable for indemnification as reinsurers. 
§21.5. Group disability insurance: Negligent misrepresentation. 
The case of Anthony v. Vaughan 1 held that a beneficiary under a 
group life insurance policy had no cause of action against the insurer 
for negligent misrepresentation to the officers and directors of the 
group insured under the policy. In so holding, the Supreme Judicial 
Court refused to extend the doctrine of liability for negligent mis-
representation expounded in Craig v. Evetett M. Brooks Co.2 on the 
ground that 
... [i]f recovery were permitted, it would extend to an indefinite 
number of unidentified members of the association holding an 
2 Id. at 828, 258 N.E.2d at 775. 
3 11 U.S.C. §§501 et seq. (1964). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 832-833, 258 N.E.2d 771, 777. 
§21.5. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 125, 255 N.E.2d 602. 
2 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967). 
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unknown number of policies. An unknown number of the plain-
tiff's fellow beneficiaries would be included, embracing persons 
not present at the meeting at which the alleged misstatement 
was made.s 
This reaffirms the limitation upon indeterminant liability drawn in 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.4 The holding of the Court makes it in-
teresting to speculate upon whether a different decision would be 
compelled if the plaintiff had alleged that the directors and officers 
of the association were agents of the insured, and that the number of 
policies and the identities of the insureds were determined at the time 
the misrepresentation was made. 
§21.6. Disability insurance: Definition of disability. Strict delin-
eation of the scope of this chapter might preclude coverage of White 
v. Finch.1 The decision of the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts may, however, prove of assistance in the con-
struction of language in disability policies. In White, the plaintiff 
sought disability benefits under the Social Security Act.2 The section 
of the act that defines disability reads in part: 
... The term "disability" means (A) inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determin-
able physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a con-
tinuous period of not less than 12 months .... 3 
Although the plaintiff suffered from multiple serious infirmities 
which were of a permanent nature, the period for which he did not 
engage in substantial gainful activity covered a span of only 5V2 
months. Judgment was ordered for the plaintiff. The Court ruled 
that the word which in this definitional section of the act modifies 
impairment rather than inability.4 Consequently, a claimant whose 
disability persists, but who does resume gainful employment prior to 
the running of the 12-month period, is not penalized for his industry. 
The opinion is well reasoned and follows a desirable trend favoring 
disability claimants.ll 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 125, 126, 255 N.E.2d 602, 604. In Craig, the Court allowed 
a general contractor to recover from a civil engineer and surveyor who negligently 
placed stakes upon land to be developed by the contractor, although no privity 
of contract existed between the two parties. 
4 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (19Sl). 
§21.6. 1 3ll F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1970). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. (1964). 
s Id. §416(i). 
4 3ll F. Supp. 307, Sll (D. Mass. 1970). 
5 In the White opinion, Judge Julian cited a number of cases which have held 
that "a liberal construction, favoring disability claimants, should be applied when 
such a construction is reasonable."· Ibid. See, e.g., Santagate v. Gardner, 293 F. 
Supp. 1284, 1288-1289 (D. Mass. 1968); Combs v. Gardner, 382 F.2d 949, 956 (6th 
Cir. 1967); Rasmussen v. Gardner, S74 F.2d 589, 594 (lOth Cir. 1967); Cancel v. 
Gardner, 268 F. Supp. 206, 209 (D.P.R. 1967). 
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·B. LEGISLATION 
§21.7 
§21.7. Regulation o.f insurers: Powers and duties. Chapter 876 of 
the Acts of 1970,1 effective January 1, 1971, represents a major effort 
to reshape G.L, c .. 175, so as to J:Dake the -Massachm.etts Business 
Corporation Law2 generally. applip1ble to domestic insurance com-
panies. The commi&sioner of insurance is designated by the act to 
administer and enfo:r:ce those provisions of G.L., c. 156B, which 
have been made applicable toinsurers,3 The act applies to all domestic 
incorporated insurance companies existing on or after the effective 
date of the act.4 Under Section 14 of the act,11 domestic insurance 
companies are authqrized, for the first time,_ to contribute funds to 
relief organizations approved as such by the commissioner of public 
welfare, and stockholders J:Day now authorize Jhe companies to make 
contributions to any organiz~tion operated exclusively for charitable, 
.scientific or educational purposes.. · 
Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1970,6 enacted as emergency legislation 
effective June 30, 1970, has the dual purpose of restricting the persons 
by whom, and the manner in which, stock control of domestic insur-
ance companies may be acquired'r a:riq establishing registration and 
reporting requirements for insurers which_ are members of an insurance 
holding ·company system.s 'these provisions do much to assure the 
continuing financial integrity of the affected companies. 
Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1970 also extends to all domestic insur-
ance companies the right to engage in other business activity ''reason-
ably complimentary or supplementary to its insuranc:e business,"9 
which right had previously been granted 'only to domestic life in-
surance companies.10 Other acts passed during the 1970 SURVEY year 
affecting investment powers Of domestic insurance . CClmpanies are 
Chapter 538,11 removing the re&triction· o:ri a domestic life insurance 
company's investment in income-producing agricultural, horticultural 
and animal husbandry property; Chapter 580,12 authorizing limited 
savings deposits by certain insurers in federal savings and loan asso-
ciations doing business in the Commonwealth; and· Chapter 642,13 
§21.7. i Repe;iling G.L:, c:· :t75, §§50, 61, ;t~ending §§!lA, .19A-D, !10, 34, 48, 49, 
5.7-60, 70-71, 77-78, 94, andin~~i~g §§!l7A, 50-50B. 
2 G.L., c. 156B. 
3 G.L., c. 175, §3A. . . , 
4 Acts of 1970, c. 876, §27. Section 27 of the 1970 amending ai:t is set out in 
the Editorial Note following Acts of 19.70, ... c: 876, §l,'.amending G.L., c. 175, §!lA. 
II Inserting in place of G.L., c. 175, § 50, three new .sections: §§50'50B. 
6 Amending G.L., c. 175, §§66, 141, and inserting §§47A, 19!lL-N. 
7 G.L., c. 175, §193M. ,. -
'' 8'Id;· ~198N:· . 
9Id: §47A. . . · 
10 Id. §66D, added by Acts' of 1967, t. 5!lD; §%. 
n Amending G,L., c. 175; §66B.. · :.:t · ··;· ·· 
·· 12 .Ani:tnt\ms ~ G;L., a:. 175; §6!1, '14B. ; ·, \ . ·' · . . . •= . 
'·'• 
1s Amending G.L., c. 175, §§1, !l, 94, .l.!l2i 1!l2B;:.I32F;1!!2G; l:{C);.:JH2, 1'44 .. 
6
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authorizing life insurance companieS to issue contracts on a variable 
basis in addition to variable annuity contracts. 
§21.8. Regulation of insurers: Insolvent insurers. Although the 
passage of Chapter 261 of the Acts of 1970,1 creating a "Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund," provides some needed and long-overdue 
relief to unsuspecting policyholders who equate insurers with financial 
stability, the act should not be presumed to provide total protection. 
The act does not apply to "life, accident and health, workmen's com-
pensation, title, surety, disability, credit, mortgage guaranty and 
ocean marine insurance."2 The Fund's limitation of liability with 
respect to any one claim is $300,000.3 This maximum is further re-
duced to the extent that a claimant may be entitled to collect under 
"any insolvency provision" in his own policy,4 a term whose precise 
meaning is open to question. 
The most important limitation on the Fund's liability is that it is 
not responsible for any claims against an insolvent insurer arising 
subsequent to 30 days "after the declaration of insolvency,"5 a phrase 
which, although again imprecise, presumably means the date upon 
which the insurer gives to the commissioner of insurance notice of 
insolvency.a The act makes it discretionary with the commissioner 
whether to require the Fund to give any notice of the insolvency to 
policyholders and other interested parties.7 It is submitted that fair-
ness dictates that such a notice be mandatory and that it be given to 
policyholders within the 30-day period during which the Fund is 
providing protection. 
The Fund members consist of all domestic insurers writing the 
types of insurance covered by the Fund, each of which must con" 
tribute, pro rata, up to 2 percent of its net direct written premiums 
for the previous year to satisfy claims against the Fund.8 If the con-
tributions are insufficient to satisfy all claims, available funds shall 
be prorated, and the unpaid portion of any unsatisfied claim shall 
be paid as soon as funds become available.9 Not unexpectedly, the 
policyholders of the nonexempt insurances will be called upon to 
absorb the entire costs of operating the Fund by means of increased 
premiums.1° . 
In addition to paying claims, the Fund is designed to serve as a 
watchdog on the solvency of its members; this, it is hoped, will pre-
vent the insolvencies giving rise to the claims. The Fund may make 
§21.8. 1 Inserting G.L., c. 175D, §§1·16. 
2 G.L., c. 175D, §2. 
3 Id. §5(l)(a). 
4 Id. §9. 
5 Id. §5(l)(a). 
6 See id. §7(1)(a). 
7 G.L., c. I75D, §7(2)(a). 
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reports to the commissioner which will not be open to public inspec-
tion, and may make recommendations for the detection and preven-
tion of insolvencies; and, in both instances, the Fund is absolved of all 
liability for any statements made by it.U 
§21.9. Policies and premiums: General. Chapter 598 of the Acts 
of 19701 implements the National Flood Insurance Act of 19682 by 
authorizing issuance of policies for flood disaster insurance by an "asso-
ciation" of insurers. Any "association" policy must designate one 
company to whom notice of loss may be given and upon whom service 
of process may be made by a policyholder. Association policies issued 
by mutual companies need not conform with the requirements that 
policyholders be members of the company and entitled to the privileges 
thereof. 
Chapter 504 of the Acts of 19703 permits insurance agents to offset 
amounts due an insured by way of return of premiiums against 
amounts due from the same insured on any other policy issued by the 
same insurer. This act does not make the same provision for insurance 
brokers, who presumably must still pay over all returns of premiums 
under threat of criminal sanction. 
§21.10. Political subdivisions: Employee insuranc:e coverage. 
Chapter 382 of the Acts of 19701 authorizes towns to provide insurance 
and compensation for their call fire fighters or volunteer fire com-
pany members whose service as such is approved by the town board 
of selectmen. The act guards against receipt of doubie compensa-
tion by fire fighters so covered. The title of the act suggests that it 
extends coverage to reserve, special, and intermittent police officers, 
but, as enacted, the act makes no provision for these groups. 
Chapter 269 of the Acts of 19702 permits employees (including re-
tired employees and deferred retirees) of political subdivisions to 
treat all group insurance coverages offered by the political subdivision 
as separable, and to apply for selected portions of the coverage. 
Chapter 626 of the Acts of 19703 permits political subdivisions to 
transfer their obligation to provide group life and health insurance 
for retired teachers and their dependents to the Group Insurance Com-
mission. Provision is made to insure continued, uninterrupted coverage 
upon the transfer. A political subdivision so electing to transfer its 
obligation is required to reimburse the commission for its pro rata 
11 Id. §§5(2)(e)-(f), 14. 
§21.9. 1 Amending G.L., c. 175, by inserting §102D. 
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§2414, 4001 et seq. 
3 Amending G.L., c. 175, §187B. 
§21.10. 1 Amending G.L., c. 32, §85H, and G.L., c. 40, §5(1). 
2 Amending G.L., c. 32B, §5. 
3 Amending G.L., c. 32B, §10, and adding G.L., c. 32A, §§12-13, and G.L.,. c. 32B, 
§llE. 
8
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share of the cost as determined by the commission. The commission 
is not required to accept an application of a political subdivision if 
deemed not to be in the best interests of the Commonwealth, the 
political subdivision, and the employees, particularly in view of past 
claim experience and premium costs of the political subdivision. 
9
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